The question of whether laws affect attitudes has inspired scholars across many disciplines, but empirical knowledge is sparse. Using longitudinal survey data from Norway and Sweden, collected before and after the implementation of a Norwegian law criminalizing the purchase of sexual services, we assess the short-run effects on attitudes using a difference-indifferences approach. In the general population, the law only made people more inclined to want to criminalize selling sex. For individuals living in the Norwegian capital, however, the law clearly affected moral attitudes toward buying sex as well as attitudes toward the criminalization of it. This supports the claim that proximity and visibility are important factors for the internalization of legal norms.
Introduction
In January 2009, buying sex became a criminal offence in Norway. One of the main aims of the law was to make people more negative toward buying sex 1 (Holmström and Skilbrei 2008; Norwegian Ministry of Justice 2008; . In this paper, we will investigate whether it succeeded. Do laws affect attitudes or are laws merely reflections of pre-existing norms? That citizens internalize the values signaled by laws is a common argument (e.g., McAdams 2000; McAdams and Rasmusen 2007) . There is, however, an explicitly acknowledged lack of studies on the causal relationship between laws and attitudes (e.g. Ellickson 2001; McAdams 2000) .
Norms as a means of explaining individual behavior has gained increasing focus in the economics literature (e.g., Akerlof 1980; Binmore and Samuelson 1994; Becker 1996) and the claim that people internalize societal norms and laws is widely accepted (Tyler 1990; McAdams and Rasmusen 2006; Cooter 2008) . More recent contributions model the interactive process between attitudes and laws (e.g., Carbonara et al. 2008) , while others try to identify the effect of institutions and policies on attitudes empirically (Alesina and FuchsSchündeln 2007; Fong et al. 2006; Soss and Schram 2007; and Svallfors 2009 ).
Alesina and Fuchs-Schündeln (2007) investigate whether individual policy preferences are endogenous to political regimes and use post-war Germany to analyze the effects of
Communism on people's preferences toward market capitalism and the role of the state in providing social services. Using the German Socioeconomic Panel, they find a large and statistically significant effect of former East Germans being more positive toward state intervention. Svallfors (2009) also investigates the role of institutions on the formation of values using the German natural experiment and similarly finds that mass publics are affected by institutional design. Soss and Schram (2007) investigate whether public opinion shifted as a result of welfare reform in the US in the 1990s. Using cross-sectional survey data, they find few opinion changes. They argue that the reforms did not affect mass opinion since they were distant to most people. Several studies try to assess the effect of smoke-free laws on attitudes (e.g., Heloma and Jakkola 2003; Tang et al. 2003; Gallus et al. 2006 ), but since most of them use cross-sectional data without control groups, they can not identify causal effects. An important exception is Fong et al. (2006) who study the effects of an Irish smoke-free law on attitudes using longitudinal data with UK residents as control group.
They find clear increases in support for total bans among smokers.
In the present study we explore the effect of the Norwegian criminalization of buying sex on attitudes toward prostitution using longitudinal survey data from Norway and Sweden.
During the investigated period, Norway, but not Sweden, changed its legal framework surrounding prostitution. This allows us to evaluate the effects of the law using a differencein-differences methodology, comparing changes in attitudes between the two countries.
Apart from issues linked directly to prostitution, the data also contains information on age, gender, income, cohabitation status, education, region of residence, as well as attitudes on issues linked to equality between the sexes, immigration, sexual liberalism, religious activities, and political views.
Our study has several advantages compared to previous studies. First of all, we use individual-level longitudinal data collected before and after the passing of a law, while Soss and Schram (2007) do not have longitudinal data and neither Svallfors (2009) nor Alesina and Fuchs-Schündeln (2007) have data on the East German population before reunification.
We also have a control group, as opposed to Soss and Schram (2007) , so that we can compare the changes in attitudes among individuals in a country where there has been a change in the law (Norway) to the changes in attitudes among individuals in a country without such a change during the period (Sweden). These two factors facilitate identification of causality. Compared to Alesina and Fuchs-Schündeln (2007) and Svallfors (2009) , who study the effects of regimes on attitudes, we assess the effect of a specific law on attitudes.
The results in this paper thereby have more practical relevance for policymakers interested in norm entrepreneurship. As opposed to Fong et al. (2006) , who look at smokers' attitudes before and after the implementation of a smoke-free law, we study the effect of laws on attitudes in the general population, as well as in groups that are more directly affected by the law. This enables us to investigate the role of the context in which a reform is introduced.
We find that criminalizing buying sex in Norway did not have large short-term effects on people's attitudes in general: it did not affect moral attitudes toward buying and selling sex and it did not make Norwegians more likely to want buying sex to be illegal, although it made them more likely to want selling sex to be illegal. However, for respondents living in Oslo (the Norwegian capital), where the sex trade was clearly visible before the reform, there were clear effects on attitudes toward prostitution. We also find that young people generally were more inclined than older people to change their views following a legal change. Finally, we find no support for the hypothesis that those who trust politicians more change their attitudes more in line with lawmakers' intentions when there is a legal change.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents our hypotheses.
Section 3 describes the data and descriptive statistics, while Section 4 describes the empirical framework. Section 5 presents the results and Section 6 concludes the paper.
Hypotheses
As mentioned in the introduction there is a wide literature in different disciplines of social science stipulating theoretical effects of laws on attitudes. In this section we will briefly describe the theoretical arguments in favor of a general effect and then move on to more specific hypotheses.
Why would laws affect attitudes? A common argument is that once institutions are in place, they create feedback effects, including normative feedback. Normative feedback effects are likely to arise when public policies provide citizens with a sense of what is desirable (Svallfors 2009 Cooter (2008) people internalize values signaled by laws in order to increase their cooperation opportunities, especially in long-run projects. Also Posner (1998; argue that people internalize norms to signal that they are of "good type." McAdams (2000) argues that laws may change behavior by signaling underlying attitudes in society to individuals concerned with approval. In such cases, a law helps people update their prior beliefs by creating a focal point (Cooter 1998) . However, the direction of the possible attitudinal change does not necessarily follow the signals sent out by the legislature. Social response theory highlights how the reaction to a law can either reinforce or undermine its effect (Carbonara et al. 2008) . In the present paper, we first test the hypothesis that laws affect attitudes.
Yet, laws may affect people differently depending on the context in which they are introduced. Soss and Schram (2007) discuss under which conditions laws and policies can be assumed to affect attitudes. A high degree of societal visibility and proximity (i.e., the degree to which individuals notice and become directly affected by the policy) makes attitudinal change more likely. The criminalization of buying sex in Norway was a highly visible reform in the sense that the media coverage was extensive (Jahnsen 2008) . Thus, there was a higher likelihood that the reform would affect attitudes than if it had not been as visible. Turning to proximity, most Norwegians are not affected directly by the law. This implies that it should not affect people's attitudes as much as it would have had if the law affected them more directly. People living in Oslo, however, were more proximate to prostitution and to the effects of the law. To them, prostitution was a clearly visible phenomenon before the enactment of the law (Skilbrei 2001 ) but has since then become much less noticeable. Thus, we expect the change in attitudes to be larger in Oslo than in the rest of the country.
The effects of laws on attitudes seem to be linked to other factors as well. Trust in politicians is argued to be important for internalization of legal norms (McAdams 2000; Ellickson 2001; McAdams and Rasmusen 2007) , which is also a common argument among scholars of legal philosophy (e.g., Cserne 2004) and political science (e.g., Peters 2005) . As argued by Ellickson (2001) , some people may feel that the government has better and more accurate information and may therefore internalize legal norms. These arguments imply that people who trust politicians should be more inclined to change their attitudes in accordance with legal changes than people who do not trust politicians.
The effects of laws on attitudes may also differ by age and across cohorts. Svallfors (2009) argues that people whose life course transition into adult life has already been fully accomplished should be more resistant to attitudinal change. Similarly, young people are expected to adapt quicker to new rules since they have fewer previous formative experiences that need to be reconsidered (Svallfors 2009 ). Thus, we expect the change in attitudes to be larger among younger persons. The hypotheses to be tested in this paper are summarized below:
• The criminalization of buying sex affects attitudes toward prostitution.
• The effect of the law is greater in the area where the effects of the reform were most proximate, i.e., in Oslo.
• People who trust politicians are more inclined to change their attitudes in accordance with a legal change.
• Younger persons are more inclined to change their attitudes in accordance with a legal change.
Data and descriptive statistics
We use survey responses from a longitudinal Internet-based survey sent out by TNS Gallup The survey included four main questions on people's attitudes toward prostitution. More exactly, the respondents were asked whether they felt it is morally acceptable or morally unacceptable to buy sex and to sell sex respectively. They responded on a 0-10 scale, where 0 implied "morally acceptable" and 10 implied "morally unacceptable." The respondents were also asked whether they thought it should be illegal to buy sex and sell sex respectively; here the possible answers were yes and no. In addition to these questions, we asked for the 2 For more information on the data, see Kotsadam (2010a and 2010b Descriptive statistics are presented in Table 1 . Regarding the dependent variables, we see that Swedes are more negative toward prostitution. They think it is more morally wrong both to buy and to sell sex and they are more inclined than Norwegians to think that both buying and selling sex should be illegal. Looking at the statistically significant trends over time, we see that respondents in both countries showed less moral concern with respect to selling sex in the second than in the first survey, and Swedes felt that selling sex should be illegal to a lesser degree than one year before. Further descriptive statistics on Norwegian attitudes toward prostitution are presented in Appendix 1.
( For Norway, the percentages differ even more: 27.0 percent of all Norwegians aged 16-66 have higher education, while the corresponding figure in our sample is 56.7 percent (Statistics Norway 2008). Furthermore, the bias towards including highly educated people is linked to non-random attrition, especially in Norway. In the first wave, 43.4 percent of the Swedes and 48.8 percent of the Norwegians had university education. We conclude that our sample is fairly representative regarding gender and age, while in terms of education it is biased toward including highly educated people and there are serious concerns regarding non-random attrition. While this should be considered when comparing raw correlations and mean values, the problem is somewhat alleviated in the regression analyses by explicitly controlling for education and other confounding factors.
Empirical framework
Since we have individual level panel data from both Norway (where the law changed during the period) and Sweden (where there was no legal change), we are able to apply a differencein-differences method. The average difference over time in the control group is subtracted from the average difference over time in the treatment group. However, since the assignment to of subjects to the two groups was not randomized, further assumptions must be made in order to establish causality.
The identifying assumption we make is that, conditional on the observed individual characteristics, the change in average attitudes of Norwegians (who did experience a legal change during the investigated period) would have been the same in absence of the new law as the change in average attitudes during the same period in Sweden (where no such new law was implemented). We thereby implicitly conjecture that the criminalization of buying sex in Sweden in 1999 did not affect the rate at which attitudes changed in Sweden during the investigated period. Under this identifying assumption, we can evaluate the causal impact of the reform. The assumption is further problematized in the concluding discussion.
We estimate the following specification:
where it Y is the moral attitude toward buying/selling sex (ranging from 0 for "morally acceptable" to 10 for "morally unacceptable") or attitude towards criminalization (taking the value one if the respondent thinks buying/selling sex should be illegal) for individual i in period t. The estimations with respect to moral attitudes are carried out using ordinary least Table 1 ). Since these variables are observed at both time periods, they enter as differences. it ε is the random error term. It is assumed to be uncorrelated with N conditional on the other variables. Variables entering as differences may also be affected by the law and hence be endogenous, and we therefore present results including only 0 i Z as well. We also run specifications including only the first wave of all control variables and specifications including only those variables for which we have data in both years as differences. The results (available upon request) are qualitatively unchanged.
Results
We start by looking at the difference in moral attitudes toward buying sex. The coefficients of OLS regressions are presented in Panel A in Table 2 . 3 Our main variable of interest is the coefficient for the Norway dummy, which is our difference-in-differences (dd) estimate as described above. In the first column we only control for gender, age, education, living in the capital region, and civil status. We see that the dd estimate (Norway) is insignificant. In
Column 2, we also include the other attitude variables as controls. These are also variables for which we have data for both years, so they enter as first differences. Also here we see that the dd estimate is insignificant.
( Table 2 about here)
To test the hypothesis that people who trust politicians are more inclined to change their opinions in line with the signals sent out by the law, we restrict the sample to those who trust politicians i.e., those who answered 6 or above on a 1-10 scale to the question, "In general, do you trust politicians?" in the second survey. 4 Since the dd estimate is still insignificant for this group, the hypothesis can not be confirmed. In Column 4 we restrict the sample to those who actually knew about the law (i.e., those who answered question "To your knowledge, is it illegal to buy/sell sex?" correctly in the second period 5 ), and in the last column we include those who both knew about the law and claimed to trust politicians. The dd estimate is insignificant for these two specifications as well, and we conclude that the law did not change Norwegians' moral attitudes toward buying sex.
We then proceed to investigate the changes in attitudes toward criminalization of buying sex;
the results of the ordered probit regressions are shown in Panel B (Table 2) . 6 As in the case of moral attitudes we see that our dd estimate is insignificant in the full sample, yet the dd estimate in Column 3 indicates support for the hypothesis that those who claimed to trust politicians were more inclined to change their attitudes. However, once we condition on actually knowing the law, which should be a necessary condition for this mechanism, there is no effect. We therefore conclude that the law did not change Norwegians' attitudes towards criminalization of buying sex.
Moving to the results on attitudes towards selling sex, we start by looking at the changes in moral attitudes. The results in Panel C (Table 2) show that the dd estimates are not statistically significant for any specification, and we thereby conclude that the law did not affect moral attitudes toward selling sex in Norway in general. The picture changes when looking at the results on changes in attitudes toward criminalization of selling sex, which are presented in Panel D (Table 2) . We note that the dd estimate is statistically significant for all specifications. Living in Norway increases the probability of having changed into wanting selling sex to be illegal and decreases the probability of having changed into wanting it to be legal by between 2 and 5 percentage points. The higher marginal effects are found in the subsample with people who trust politicians to a greater extent. While this seems to suggest some support of the hypothesis that trust in politicians is important, one should keep in mind that the direction is the opposite of what was intended (the lawmakers wished for more negative attitudes towards buying sex but explicitly not towards selling). Thus, there is no support for the claim that trust in politicians affects attitudes in the intended way. Also, when using the responses to the trust question from the first wave, the marginal effects are larger for the subgroup trusting politicians, but the effect becomes insignificant when conditional on knowing the law.
That the legal change seems to have affected attitudes toward criminalization of selling sex but not buying sex may come as a surprise since the law focuses only on buying sex.
However, as put forth in the Norwegian debate (especially by Pro Sentret, 7 whose position is that the stigmatization of sellers will increase as a result of the recently implemented law), a law that criminalizes buyers is likely to affect attitudes toward selling as well, since it puts focus on the issue and signals that there is a problem. Another interpretation is that the law led to opposition in the sense that people now think that both parties of the transaction should be liable, which is contrary to the lawmakers' view. The summary statistics reveal, however, that the effect is driven by Swedes having changed more into thinking selling sex should not be illegal and Norwegians in fact think it should be illegal to a lesser extent after the implementation of the law than before. Given our identifying assumption, the effects of the law are, however, that Norwegians became more likely to think it should be illegal to sell sex than they would have been in the absence of legal change (where they would have changed even more).
To test the hypothesis of younger people being more prone to change their attitudes we interact the Norway indicator variable with the vector 0 i Z . The results are presented in Table 3 below.
( Table 3 about here)
We see that for all variables, the coefficient of age is positive, meaning that as Swedes get older, they become more in favor of criminalization and tend to view buying as well as 7 Pro Sentret is a non governmental organization that works with prostitutes and provides information on prostitution.
selling sex as increasingly immoral. The Norway indicator variable interacted with age is negative and statistically significant for the two specifications regarding buying sex.
8 This means that older Norwegians changed less toward thinking that buying sex is immoral and also changed less toward thinking that buying sex should be illegal. Analysis with cohort dummies (available upon request) further confirms that younger Norwegians changed their attitudes more than older Norwegians as an effect of the law. We thereby confirm the hypothesis that younger people are more prone to adapt their attitudes in response to legal changes and we also note that the direction of change follows the lawmakers' intentions.
Finally, in order to test the general hypothesis of proximity suggested by Soss and Schram (2007) and our more specific hypothesis of a greater effect in Oslo, we restrict the treatment group to only include only people living in Oslo. The comparison group is still the Swedish sample, which had no treatment during the period. Table 4 presents the results. Interestingly, we see that people in Oslo changed their attitudes toward thinking that buying sex is more immoral and also toward wanting buying sex to be illegal. They do not think that selling sex is more immoral or that it should be illegal to a greater extent than they did before. The marginal effect of living in Oslo implies an 8.2 percentage point higher probability of having changed opinion from wanting buying sex to be legal to wanting it to be illegal, and Oslo residents are also 5.3 percentage points less likely to have changed into thinking buying sex should be legal. It should also be noted that these changes are driven by Oslo residents themselves thinking that buying sex is more immoral and that it should be illegal, e.g., 51.6 percent of the people living in Oslo thought it should be illegal prior to the law while 58.7 thought so in the second survey. When using only the Swedish capital (Stockholm) as control group the statistical significance of the effect on moral attitudes towards buying sex disappears. This effect was only significant at the 10 percent level when comparing to the whole of Sweden and we lose around three-quarters of the sample size by only including Stockholm. Regarding the other dependent variables the results (including marginal effects)
are qualitatively unchanged (all results are available upon request).
( Table 4 about here)
In order to understand why people in Oslo changed their opinion, we look at whether they in the second survey perceived the law as more effective in terms of reducing the amount of sex bought. The dependent variable in this case is the change in the answer to the question:
"Do you think a law criminalizing buying sex would reduce the amount of sex bought?". We also investigate whether they have their perceptions of how the women in the prostitution market fare. The dependent variable in this case is the change in the answer to the question:
"What proportion of the prostitutes do you think enjoy their work?". The results are presented in Columns 5 and 6 of Table 4 . We find no evidence of these factors driving the change in attitudes in the Oslo sub-sample.
Discussion and conclusion
Using longitudinal data we investigate the attitudinal effects of the criminalization of buying sex in Norway (1 January 2009), which had as one of its key aims to make people more negative toward buying sex. We conducted surveys in Norway and Sweden where we asked for people's opinions about prostitution during the fall of 2008 and the fall of 2009, i.e., before and after the criminalization of buying sex in Norway, and evaluate the effects in a difference-in-differences estimation with Swedish respondents as control group.
We find that the law did not succeed in making Norwegians in general more negative toward buying sex. However, it did make them more inclined to want to criminalize selling sex than they would have been in the absence of the law. As suggested by social response theory a legal change can lead to attitude changes contrary to the expectations of lawmakers (e.g., Carbonara et al. 2008 ). Whether our results should be interpreted in such a way is not clear since the attitudes toward buying sex did not change into being more positive. The results may suggest, however, that the worries put forth in the Norwegian debate that the law would increase stigmatization of sex sellers should be taken seriously. Yet, it is important to note that while Norwegians actually became less inclined to want to criminalize selling sex, our results indicate that they could have become even less so in absence of the law.
In accordance with our hypothesis, we find that people living in the Norwegian capital (Oslo) changed their attitudes more than the general population. This supports the more general hypothesis suggested by Soss and Schram (2007) that laws and policies are more likely to affect attitudes the more visible and proximate they are to people. Comparing the results of previous studies on the effects of laws, regimes, and policies on attitudes further strengthens this point. The division and re-unification of Germany (Svallfors 2009; Alesina and Fuchs-Schündeln 2007) was clearly visible and proximate to people and also affected attitudes as expected. In contrast, the U.S. welfare reform studied by Soss and Schram (2007) was distant to most Americans, as was the law studied here to most Norwegians, and consequently there were limited effects on attitudes in both cases. The clear effects found on attitudes toward the Irish smoke-free law (Fong et al. 2006 ) are also expected since the effect was evaluated only among smokers. For this group, the law was clearly proximate, which can be compared to our Oslo sub-sample for which we also find the expected effects.
Comparing the intended effects of the law to the results in the Oslo region, we can see that the politicians' intentions have been fulfilled. People in Oslo now think it should be illegal to buy sex to a larger extent than before the law. They also think it is more immoral to buy sex than they used to. Given our identifying assumptions, these two changes are not merely trends -they are causal effects of the law. Furthermore, the law has not made people living in Oslo think that selling sex is immoral or that it should be illegal to a greater extent, which implies that the worries put forward concerning the increased stigmatization of sex sellers do not apply for this group.
We also find that younger people changed their attitudes more, and in the direction of the lawmakers' intentions, than older people as a result of the law. This supports claims from institutional and socialization theory (e.g., Svallfors 2009) that those with fewer previous formative experiences in need of reconsideration are more prone to internalize legal norms.
The hypothesis that people who trust politicians change attitudes more in the intended direction when a law is enacted is not supported. Trust in politicians only magnifies the wish to criminalize selling sex which was against the lawmakers' intensions. Although this result In order to generalize the results, a few caveats are necessary, especially since we might underestimate the effects of legal change on attitudes for several reasons. First of all, it is likely that laws affect attitudes more over time periods longer than eight months, and there is indicative evidence that the enactment of the same law changed attitudes in Sweden to a considerable degree (Jakobsson and Kotsadam 2010a) . As Ellickson (2001) argues, there may be lags in the effects on attitudes due to cognitive biases toward status quo derived from loss aversion or due to a difficulty of displacing already internalized norms. A related mechanism through which laws may have long-run effects is through the replacement of cohorts as suggested by Svallfors (2009) , and our results of more change among younger people indicate that this is likely. It is therefore important to keep in mind that the results of this paper concern the short-run effects of laws on attitudes.
Since we are unable to distinguish between any "direct effect" of the law and the effect attained via the media debate, a related issue is that the media discussion had started before the first wave of the survey was distributed (see e.g., Jahnsen 2008). In addition, it was at this point clear that the law would be implemented. Both these factors are likely to underestimate the effects of the law reported in this paper. However, the debate was more widespread during the final months before implementation (and hence after the first survey was sent out), and we can see that the level of knowledge about the law was lower when respondents answered the survey the first time (43 percent of the Norwegian respondents knew the legal framework in the first survey while 59 percent did in the second). It is therefore likely that people updated their knowledge between the two surveys.
These caveats are also important for our identifying assumption that the change in average attitudes for individuals living in Norway would have been the same in absence of the law as the change for individuals living in Sweden. Since the media debate started and information about the reform became available before we sent out the first survey, the possible process of attitudinal change had probably already started. As we show, however, knowledge was updated and media coverage became intense after the respondents had answered the first survey probably implying a possible underestimation of the magnitude of the causal effect;
yet it does not imply that the effects we find are not causal. The problem of lags in responses to legal change is also problematic since if there are long lags with considerable effects, Swedes may constitute an inappropriate control group as a similar law was enacted in Sweden ten years earlier. In the worst case scenario (for our assumption) of still persisting effects of the Swedish law on the rate of change in attitudes among Swedes, our results are still important for comparing the difference between short-term and long-term effects. Both of these limitations of the identifying assumption could have been resolved by collecting more waves of data further back in time, which is a path we recommend future researchers to take (although it is difficult to gather detailed information on attitudes toward a relevant law that nobody knows will be implemented). Compared to existing literature, however, this paper amplifies knowledge in the area.
We suggest that further research be undertaken to investigate the longer run effects of laws on attitudes and effects of different types of laws and in different contexts. The comparison of realized and intended effects in the general population and in Oslo raises interesting questions not only about the contextual prerequisites for effects but also for their direction. Mean values presented; standard deviation in parentheses. Notes: This table reports the effect of the law on attitudes. Panels A-D present the four different dependent variables. Regressions in Panel A and C are conducted using OLS. In Panels B and D present coefficients from ordered probit regressions. Controls in all regressions include age, gender, income, cohabitation status, education, and region of residence for individual i observed in the first period (Zi0). Columns 2-5 also include ∆Trust, ∆Religious, ∆Public sector, ∆Gender equality, ∆Co-responsible, ∆Anti immigration and ∆Sexual liberal as controls. In Column 3 the sample is restricted to those who trust politicians. Column 4 includes those who know what the law says. In Column 5 the sample is restricted to those who both trust politicians and know the law. In Columns 3 and 5 ∆Trust is not included since the sample is restricted with respect to trust. Standard errors in parentheses.
Tables
Observations 2087 2048 852 1310 591 (Table A1) Regarding attitudes toward criminalizing buying sex (Table A2) 
